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Abstract
Are people more generous when less money is at stake? The Ultimatum Game (UG) and Dictator 
Game (DG) are often used as models of bargaining and charitable giving, respectively. Previous 
studies have produced conflicting results on whether UG and DG offers are lower when the 
stakes are high, and many previous studies had insufficient statistical power to detect significant 
effects of stake size. To resolve this, we conducted a meta-analysis of 31 existing studies that 
manipulated the size of participants’ endowments in the UG and DG (3233 total participants). 
We hypothesized that: 1) proposer offers would be lower with larger stakes in both games, owing 
to an increased cost of giving; and 2) offers would decrease more with stake size in the DG than 
the UG because proposers would not want to risk their offer being rejected in the UG. Our results 
found almost zero effect of stake size on UG offers (d=0.02), and a small but significant effect of 
stake size on DG offers (d=0.14). Furthermore, larger differences in stakes had little impact on 
the effect sizes in the UG, but had a medium-large impact on the effect sizes in the DG. These 
results show that higher stakes reduce donations in the DG, albeit not by much, and have little to 
no effect in the UG.
Keywords: bargaining, altruism, donations, endowment, stake size, meta-analysis
JEL codes: C78 (bargaining theory), C91 (Laboratory, individual behavior), D90 (Micro-





50 Stone Rd. E.
Guelph, ON, Canada, N1G 5L5







32 Bargaining Games 
33 Researchers have used bargaining game experiments in the fields of psychology and 
34 economics for many years with the hope of extrapolating their results to real-world bargaining 
35 situations. Güth et al. (1968) introduced one such type of game, termed the Ultimatum Game 
36 (UG), to model bargaining situations such as contract or other business negotiations. The UG is a 
37 two-person game where one person (the proposer) makes an offer to the second person (the 
38 responder) about how they would suggest dividing a given stake. The responder can either accept 
39 or reject this offer; acceptance would split the stake as proposed, but rejection (of an unfair offer) 
40 would result in neither party getting any of the stake. Güth et al. (1968) note the need for strategy 
41 formation in the UG; each person is essentially acting independently from the other in their own 
42 self-interest. The UG examines how strategy formation (i.e. finding the lowest offer the 
43 responder will accept) interacts with self-serving behaviors (trying to keep as much of the stake 
44 as possible) (Güth & Kocher, 2013) under varying circumstances by measuring either how much 
45 the proposer will offer, or how little the responder will accept. 
46 Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler (1986) introduced a second type of bargaining game, the 
47 Dictator Game (DG), to model charitable giving and examine other-regarding behavior. Forsythe 
48 et al. (1994) developed a simplified version of the DG that is commonly used in experiments 
49 (Engel, 2011). The DG is also a two-person game in which the proposer offers a portion of their 
50 stake to a responder who does not have the choice to reject. The DG measures how much 
51 proposers give under experimentally manipulated conditions, to mimic giving in charitable 
52 settings.
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53 General trends in the DG and UG. Researchers typically compare results from the DG 
54 and UG to economic theoretical predictions to examine how human characteristics contribute to 
55 proposer and responder behavior. They generally find that human behavior deviates from these 
56 predictions. In the DG, theory predicts that to maximize their payoff, proposers should offer zero 
57 to the responder, as there is no risk of punishment for being selfish or benefit for being generous. 
58 However, Engel’s (2011) meta-analysis of the DG found that DG proposers only offer zero 36% 
59 of the time, on average. Instead, Engel (2011) reports DG offers tend to be greater than zero – 
60 averaging about 28.3% of the given stake – and deviations from this average tend to be smaller 
61 than 28.3%. This deviation from the theoretical prediction can be explained by the presence of 
62 various human characteristics that standard economic theory does not account for. These 
63 characteristics largely include other-regarding behaviors such as adhering to cultural fairness 
64 norms (Rabin, 1993), generosity, and approval-seeking. Individual differences in these human 
65 characteristics can also contribute to explaining between-subject behavior differences in the DG.
66 In the UG, theory predicts that to maximize their payoff, proposers should offer the 
67 smallest possible non-zero amount that the responder will accept (Webster, 2013). The 
68 responder, to maximize their own payoff, should be willing to accept any offer above zero, 
69 regardless of the proportion. Rejections would only occur, then, in response to zero offers as it 
70 has no cost to the responder to do so (Webster, 2013). Early UG studies, however, report that UG 
71 proposers typically reject offers they perceive to be unfair to punish the proposer for being 
72 selfish (Cameron, 1999). Offers perceived to be unfair are, on average, those less than 20-30% of 
73 the stake (Camerer & Thaler, 1995). Because of the tendency of the responders to reject unfair 
74 offers and the ability of the proposer to predict such rejections, offers in the UG average 40-50% 
75 of the stake in industrialized societies (Oosterbeek, Sloof & Van De Kuilen, 2004). Although 
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76 small-scale societies sometimes have lower offers than in industrialized societies, no societies 
77 conform to the standard economic prediction of near-zero offers and universal rejections 
78 (Henrich et al., 2010). In addition to human characteristics that influence behavior in the DG, 
79 UG behavior is also influenced by risk aversion on the part of the proposer; since proposers can 
80 predict the human tendency of the responder to reject unfair offers, proposers tend to offer higher 
81 amounts than the theoretically predicted, smallest non-zero, offer to reduce the risk of their offer 
82 being rejected (Holt & Laury, 2002). Like the other human characteristics that affect these 
83 games, participants can also have individual differences in risk aversion that may account for 
84 between-subject behavior differences.
85 Since the establishment of these trends, a main focus of research on these games has 
86 increasingly been put on finding explanatory factors for deviations from these averages to 
87 uncover confounds and make the games more representative of real-world bargaining situations. 
88 Effect of Stake Size
89 One of the factors researchers commonly examine in these games is how characteristics 
90 of the stake itself affect proposer behavior. Authors of early DG and UG studies (e.g. Hoffman, 
91 McCabe & Smith, 1996; Cameron,1999; Güth et al., 1968) mention that the size of the stake may 
92 act as a confound, as lab studies typically use relatively small stake sizes due to budgetary 
93 constraints. However, many of the real-world bargaining or charitable situations to which these 
94 games hope to generalize involve much larger stakes. To reconcile this potential conflict, 
95 researchers studying stake size effects ask whether the average deviations from theory would be 
96 similar enough in higher stake conditions to justify generalizations of low stake, budget-friendly 
97 experiments to higher stake conditions. There have been conflicting findings, however, about the 
98 effect of stake size in bargaining games, which has led researchers using the UG or DG to either 
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99 control for stake size or not, depending on the state of research at the time of their study. It is 
100 important to know if there is an effect or not so researchers can have an idea of whether stake 
101 size is an important confound to control for. 
102 Measuring stake size effects. Past studies that have examined stake size effects have 
103 done so by creating separate low, high, and possibly intermediate stake size conditions. Due to 
104 the limited budget a lab may have to conduct their study, the high-stake condition may still be a 
105 relatively low amount. To make high stakes conditions more practical, some researchers have 
106 used hypothetical stake conditions, allowing them to set the stake size to any desired amount (Xu 
107 et al., 2016; Amir et al., 2012; Ben-Ner et al., 2008). Hypothetical stake conditions assume that 
108 people will accurately estimate how they would behave in a real stakes condition with the same 
109 amount of money; however, some researchers question this assumption (e.g. Xu et al., 2016). 
110 Other researchers have overcome budgetary constraints by conducting their studies in developing 
111 countries where lower currency values relative to USD$ lowers the cost of creating high stakes 
112 conditions (e.g. Slonim & Roth, 1998; Andersen et al., 2011). 
113 State of the Research
114 Stake effects in non-bargaining games. In a review of incentive effects on participant 
115 performance in experiments, Camerer & Hogarth (1999) found little effect of stakes on behavior, 
116 but found that variance in performance may decrease as stakes increase. Additionally, Kocher, 
117 Martinsson & Visser (2008) found no effect of stakes on cooperation or punishment in the Public 
118 Goods Game (PGG). Johanssen-Stenman, Mahmud & Martinsson (2005), however, found that 
119 offers in trust games decreased significantly as stake size increased. 
120 Stake effects in the DG and UG. Among the studies examining the effects of stake size 
121 on proposer behavior, Hoffman et al. (1996), Slonim & Roth, (1998), Andersen (2011), Forsythe 
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122 et al. (1994), and Engel (2011) are some of the most frequently cited in studies examining stake 
123 size effects. Hoffman et al. (1996) compared the effect of $10 and $100 stakes on proposer offers 
124 in the UG, but found no significant differences in offers between conditions. Slonim & Roth 
125 (1998) conducted a UG in the Slovak Republic, varying the stakes from 60, 300, and 1500 
126 Slovak Crowns (USD$1.90, $9.70, $48.40), but found no effect on proposer behavior. Similarly, 
127 Forsythe et al., (1994) found no effect of comparing $5 and $10 stakes. 
128 In contrast, Andersen et al. (2011) compared stakes of 20, 200, 2000 and 20 000 rupees (a 
129 substantially large stake) (USD$0.41, $4.10, $41.00, $410.00) in an UG in Northeast India, and 
130 found that proposers offered significantly lower proportions in the higher stake condition. 
131 Similarly, a frequently cited meta study by Engel (2011) examined the effects of several factors 
132 on the DG, and found a small but significant effect of stake size where proposers offered lower 
133 proportions in the higher stake conditions. 
134 Of the studies that have found an effect of stakes, many are newer studies that have 
135 increased the differences between stake conditions compared to older studies (e.g. Leibbrandt et 
136 al., 2015 (TK100 (USD$1.22) vs. TK10000 (USD$122.00); Andersen et al., 2011) indicating 
137 that the high stakes conditions in the studies that did not have an effect may have had too small 
138 of an amount as the high stake condition to be able to see this difference (e.g. Forsythe et al.’s 
139 (1994) stakes of $5 and $10). Additionally, any studies that have found an effect of stake size in 
140 the DG or UG have found that offers decrease with increasing stakes. 
141 Large-scale studies. Other large scale studies attempting to consolidate stake effects in 
142 the DG and UG included an array of studies with potential confounds of the effect of stake size 
143 on proposer behavior (Engel, 2011: small effect of stakes in the DG; Karagözoğlu & Urhan, 
144 2016: inconclusive). These confounds include: stake origin (earned versus windfall), where 
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145 earned stakes reduce willingness to give in the DG (Bediou et al., 2012; Cherry, 2001); whether 
146 the responder knows the stake size or not, where offers decrease when the stake is unknown to 
147 the responder (Rapoport & Sundali, 1996; Rapoport, Sundali, & Seale, 1996; Straub & 
148 Murnighan, 1995); varying levels of inequality when the responder also has a starting stake, 
149 where offers decrease when responders start with a higher stake (Korenok, Millner, & Razzolini, 
150 2012); and hypothetical versus real stakes, where results are varied (Amir et al., 2012; Ben-Ner 
151 et al., 2008). The current study will select studies that do not involve these confounding factors 
152 to isolate effects of the size of the stake only.
153 The Current Study
154 We use a meta-analytic approach consolidate the data on the effects of stake size on 
155 proposer behavior in the UG and DG that have been observed thus far to determine if there is a 
156 significant effect of stake size on offers. This will update past studies with newer research while 
157 controlling for confounds not previously accounted for. This information should provide insight 
158 into whether stake size is a variable that researchers should consider as a confound in UG and 
159 DG studies as it relates to proposer behavior, and whether low stakes games are generalizable to 
160 high stake conditions. 
161 Hypotheses. We predict that: 1) in the UG and DG, there will be an effect of stake size 
162 on proposer behavior, causing proposer offers to decrease as the stake size increases; and 2) there 
163 will be a larger effect of stake size in the DG in this way than in the UG because of the added 
164 influence of risk in the UG. 
165 Rationale: Theoretical basis of stake size effects. When studies do report an effect of 
166 stakes, they tend to find that offers decrease as stake size increases. Higher stakes increase the 
167 cost (i.e. the total amount of money that would have to be given) of making an offer from what  
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168 the same proportion would have cost in a lower stakes condition (e.g. parting with $500 of a 
169 $1000 stake (50%), compared to parting with only $5 of a $10 stake). This higher cost of giving 
170 may make the proposer less willing to part with the same proportion of the stake they might have 
171 in lower stake conditions, where the cost of giving is much lower (Andersen et al., 2011; Slonim 
172 & Roth, 1998; Hoffman et al., 1996). Additionally, Fu, Kong & Yang (2007) suggest that as the 
173 cost of giving and stake size increases this way, the money becomes more salient than any social 
174 concerns that influence the offer size at lower stakes. Similarly, Bethwaite & Tompkinson (1993) 
175 suggest that other-regarding behaviors and fairness norms become less important as stakes 
176 increase. This model would predict that proposers would decrease their offers as stakes increase.
177 Compared to the DG, the UG may be less impacted by stake size because of the added 
178 presence of risk in the UG. As stakes increase, risk aversion also increases in the UG as there is 
179 more to lose if the offer is rejected (Karagözoğlu & Urhan, 2016), causing proposers to increase 
180 offers to prevent rejection from the proposer (Holt & Laury, 2002). This factor works to 
181 minimize any increased saliency of the money due to the higher stake, resulting in the UG 
182 showing less of an effect of stake size than the DG.
183 Method. We will use a meta-analysis to answer this question. A meta-analysis can work 
184 to increase the confidence of a result from single experiments because of the large cumulative 
185 sample size that results from pooling data across samples in multiple studies. If many studies 
186 report a similar effect, consolidating these studies using a meta-analysis can provide support of 
187 the existence of this effect with greater confidence than one study could have on its own. 
188 Furthermore, while any single study is subject to sampling error and may over- or underestimate 
189 the true effect size, a meta-analysis can average out this sampling error by combining multiple 
190 studies. Our meta-analysis will consolidate UG and DG studies that have manipulated stake size 
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191 by searching the PSYCInfo, Web of Science, Google Scholar, and Econlit databases using 
192 specific search, inclusion, and exclusion criteria, and by sending messages to relevant listservs to 
193 find unpublished studies. We calculated the standardized mean differences of offers between 
194 conditions to analyze the average effect size over all studies.  
195 Method
196 Locating Studies
197 We conducted searches of the PSYCInfo, Google Scholar, Web of Science, and Econlit 
198 databases using various combinations of the following search terms: dictator game or games, 
199 ultimatum game or games, bargaining game or games, stake or stake size, endowment or 
200 endowment size, pie or pie size; we note that Google Scholar searches many working papers and 
201 unpublished articles. We also searched reference lists of the articles located by the database 
202 searches for additional relevant studies. Additionally, we sent e-mails asking for published or 
203 unpublished studies to the e-mail lists of the Economic Science Association, Society for 
204 Personality and Social Psychology, and Human Behavior and Evolution Society. Finally, we put 
205 out a call for studies on Twitter which resulted in 21,015 impressions and 127 total engagements. 
206 Whenever a study had insufficient statistical detail to calculate effect sizes for stakes (e.g., no 
207 standard deviations or inferential statistics on stakes), we attempted to contact the authors for 
208 clarification or raw data. 
209 Study Selection Criteria
210 Inclusion criteria. We selected two-player UG and DG games, as studies using more 
211 than two-players introduce additional layers of complexity that may confound the findings on 
212 stake size effects. We only included games using adult players; although studies have been done 
213 with children (Blake & Rand, 2010; Posid et al., 2015), other studies examining child behavior in 
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214 these games have found children’s perceptions of fairness and giving tendencies to fluctuate with 
215 age (Kogut, 2012). This finding gives us reason to include only adults since the results of UGs 
216 and DGs are typically extrapolated to adult bargaining or giving situations. We also included 
217 studies that use modified versions of the UG and DG in which the researchers present the 
218 proposer with a limited set of offers to choose from, as this is seen to assess offer behavior the 
219 same way a free-choice experiment would (Bolton, Katok & Zwick, 1998; Engel, 2011).  
220 Exclusion criteria. Table 1 summarizes the exclusion criteria along with the rationale for 
221 exclusion and any exceptions for a study’s inclusion despite matching exclusion criteria. The 
222 Appendix includes a list of excluded studies and the rationales for their exclusion.
223




Confounds the effects of stakes with the 
effects of entitlement
Exception for Inclusion
Data from unearned or windfall 
conditions of the same paper can 
be included
Alternate framings without 
control
Does not assess offering behavior in 
the same way (e.g. framed as proposer 
taking from the responder’s stake 
instead of giving part of their own)
Data from normal framing (i.e. 
give) conditions can be included 
if they involve varying stakes. 
Data from alternate framings is 
included if both high and low 
stakes have same framing
Priming or other 
experimental manipulation 
before the main task
May introduce a confound on 
proposer behavior
Data from control (i.e. 
unprimed) conditions can be 
included
Conditions where responder 
does not know stake size
May introduce a confound on 
proposer behavior; e.g. Straub & 
Murnighan (1995) show that when 
responders do not know the stake size, 
they tend to accept lower offers, and 
proposers tend to propose lower offers, 
independent of stake size effects
Data from control (i.e. known 




where stake sizes are 
equivalent in purchasing 
power
Stake sizes appear to vary, but are 
only varied as a method to keep stake 
size equivalent across cultures by 
accounting for variation in purchasing 
power (Henrich et al., 2010)
N/A
Hypothetical stakes May introduce a confound on proposer 
behavior; may or may not be seen to 
increase offer size as risk decreases 
from lack of real consequences of 
losing money (e.g. Amir et al., 2012; 
Keushnigg, Bader & Bracher, 2016)
N/A
Paper does not contain new 
data on stakes in Ultimatum 
or Dictator Games (e.g., 
theoretical model, review, 
different game)
Meta-analysis combines empirical 
studies, not theoretical results
N/A
Insufficient statistical detail 
to calculate effect size (e.g., 
no SD or SEM, imprecise 
statistics like “n.s.”) plus 
authors could not provide 
raw data for us to calculate 
it ourselves
If there is insufficient detail to calculate 
an effect size for a study, then there is 





227 We organized the included studies using the following categories: type of game (UG or 
228 DG/ classic or modified), sizes of stakes between conditions, and reported effect of stake size 
229 including statistical data. 
230 Data Analysis
231 Conditions analyzed. The analyses include the effect of stake size on proposer behavior 
232 separately for the DG and the UG, together for both games, and for the difference in effect size 
233 between the DG and UG, resulting in three overall measures.
234 Measure of effect. We extracted data necessary from each study to calculate standardized mean 
235 differences (Cohen’s d) and confidence intervals. The type of data collected depended on what 
236 had been reported by the authors which included sample sizes, t values of differences between 
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237 offer size in each stake condition, means and standard deviations of offers in each stake 
238 condition, or the raw data reporting individual offers in each stake condition. Once converted to 
239 Cohen’s d, we used the metaphor (Viechtbauer, 2010) package in the R statistical software (R 
240 Core Team, 2013) to conduct both a random and fixed-effects meta-analysis to yield average 
241 effect sizes and confidence intervals for the UG and DG studies separately, and together. We 
242 calculated unbiased Cohen’s d values, which  uses δ to weight each study’s SD by the sample 
243 size, in order to correct for any bias due to small samples common among the included studies 
244 (Cumming, 2013). Studies were weighted by inverse variance. We used the Q test for 
245 heterogeneity to determine whether a random-effects model – used in cases of high heterogeneity 
246 between studies – was justified over a fixed-effects model. Study data and analysis scripts are 
247 available at [https://osf.io/hc3py/?view_only=8a78540a4d1546a4be97628fd67a8016. Note: this 
248 is a blind link for reviewers, and will be replaced by our non-blinded link upon publication].
249 Because of the wide variety of stake conditions the authors used, we also calculated 
250 correlation coefficients (r) to examine any potential relationships between the calculated effect 
251 sizes and the differences in stake sizes used. 
252
253 Results
254 Included and Excluded Studies
255 The meta-analysis included a total of 21 papers using the UG, the DG, or both (UG only, 
256 N=7; DG only, N=10; both, N=4), resulting in 31 effect sizes (UG, Nd=13; DG, Nd=18) from 
257 3233 total participants, as summarized in Table 2. The weights are based on the inverse variance 
258 of the estimate, which is strongly affected by sample size – larger studies are weighted more. 
259 There was a wide range of stakes: the median high stake condition was $100 in the UG (range: 
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260 $10 to >1 year income (Andersen et al., 2011) and $20 in the DG (range: $10 to 100 days salary 
261 (Leibbrandt et al., 2015)). In the median study, the high stakes were worth 10 times more than 
262 the low stakes in the UG (range: 2 to 10,000) and 4.5 times more in the DG (range: 1.75 to 100).
263 We excluded a total of 80 papers that went against our exclusion criteria. The most 
264 common reasons for exclusion were: they were not empirical studies of a UG or DG (14 papers), 
265 had hypothetical stakes instead of varying real stakes (11 papers), had earned endowments 
266 without an unearned control (7 studies), UG responders did not know the stakes (6 studies), or 
267 did not provide sufficient statistical detail (e.g., standard deviations, inferential statistics) to 
268 calculate effect sizes and we were unable to contact the authors for data (11 studies). Many of the 
269 studies were not principally designed to test the effects of stakes, which is perhaps why they did 
270 not present sufficient statistical detail on this question, and why they met our exclusion criteria. 
271 The Appendix (Table 3) contains the full list of excluded studies and rationales.
272 There is no evidence for publication bias. The funnel plot (Figure 1) is symmetrical, and 
273 a regression test for funnel plot asymmetry was non-significant, z=1.25, p=.21. Anecdotally, the 
274 earliest studies on stake size tended to find no effect of stakes (e.g., Cameron, 1999; Forsythe et 
275 al., 1994; Hoffman et al., 1996; Ruffle, 1998), and this finding was seen as reassuring because it 
276 suggested that these games were invariant to stakes. Some studies even touted no effect of 
277 stakes, despite finding a small-medium effect that was non-significant due to low statistical 
278 power (e.g., Carpenter et al., 2005). As such, the usual reasons for publication bias (i.e., non-
279 significant results not getting published) do not appear to exist for this research question, and the 
280 symmetrical funnel plot supports this contention.
281
282 Table 2: Ultimatum Games (UG) and Dictator Games (DG) included in the meta-analysis. 











Andersen et al., 2011 UG No 126 Rs20/Rs200/ 
Rs2000/Rs20000
1000 4.0% 0.27 [-0.09, 0.62]
Cameron 1999, UG2 UG Yes 37 Rp5000/Rp40000 8 4.8% -0.16 [-0.47, 0.14]
Cameron 1999, UG1 UG Yes 35 Rp5000/Rp200000 40 6.3% -0.09 [-0.33, 0.15]
Carpenter et al., 2005 UG UG No 39 $10/$100 10 1.6% 0.36 [-0.27, 1.00]
Carpenter et al., 2005 DG DG No 40 $10/$100 10 1.6% 0.33 [-0.29, 0.96]
Carr & Mellizo, 2017 UG No 84 $10/$20/$40 4 3.0% -0.14 [-0.57, 0.29]
Cherry, 2001 DG No 50 $16-$28 1.75 1.9% -0.00 [-0.56, 0.56]
Cherry & Shogren, 2008 DG No 68 $10/$20 2 2.6% -0.22 [-0.69, 0.26]
Cherry et al., 2002 DG No 52 $10/$40 4 2.1% 0.11 [-0.43, 0.66]
Forsythe et al., 1994 UG UG No 67 $5/$10 2 2.4% -0.12 [-0.62, 0.38]
Forsythe et al., 1994 DG DG No 69 $5/$10 2 2.4% -0.06 [-0.55, 0.44]
Fu et al., 2007 UG No 397 NT$200/NT$1000 5 5.4% 0.25 [-0.03, 0.53]
Gabay et al., 2018 UG Yes 20 £6-£53 20 0.8% 0.62 [-0.32, 1.57]
Harrison & El Mouden 2011 DG No 30 £2/£4/£6/£8/£10 5 1.2% 0.22 [-0.51, 0.95]
Heinz et al., 2012 DG No 83 €5/€10 2 3.0% 0.25 [-0.19, 0.68]
Hoffman et al., 1996 UG No 51 $10/$100 10 2.0% -0.07 [-0.62, 0.48]
Kettner & Waichman, 2016 Take DG No 43 $5/$20 4 1.7% 0.14 [-0.46, 0.74]
Kettner & Waichman, 2016 Give DG No 44 $5/$20 4 1.7% 0.39 [-0.22, 1.00]
Keuschnigg et al., 2016 UG USA UG No 186 $1/$4/$10 10 5.1% -0.07 [-0.36, 0.22]
Keuschnigg et al., 2016 UG India UG No 186 $0.40/$1.60/$0.40 10 5.1% -0.07 [-0.36, 0.22]
Keuschnigg et al., 2016 DG USA DG No 190 $1/$4/$10 10 5.2% -0.08 [-0.36, 0.21]
Keuschnigg et al., 2016 DG India DG No 190 $0.40/$1.60/$0.40 10 5.2% 0.17 [-0.12, 0.45]
Leibbrandt et al., 2015 Take DG No 45 100Tk/10000Tk 100 1.8% -0.10 [-0.69, 0.42]
Leibbrandt et al., 2015 Give DG No 45 100Tk/10000Tk 100 1.6% 1.10 [0.47, 1.72]
Raihani et al., 2013 India DG No 282 $1/$5/$10 10 6.4% 0.32 [0.08, 0.56]
Raihani et al., 2013 USA DG No 292 $1/$5/$10 10 6.5% -0.00 [-0.23, 0.23]
Reinstein et al., 2012 DG No 102 €5/€7.5/€10 2 3.3% 0.54 [0.14, 0.94]
Ruffle, 1998 UG UG No 44 $4/$10 2.5 1.7% 0.55 [-0.05, 1.15]
Ruffle, 1998 DG DG No 52 $4/$10 2.5 2.1% -0.11 [-0.66, 0.43]
Schier et al., 2016 DG No 202 Tickets for $10/$500 50 5.4% 0.23 [-0.05, 0.51]
Slonim & Roth, 1998 UG No 82 Sk60/Sk300/Sk1500 25 2.2% 0.05 [-0.47, 0.58]
283 a Rs=Indian rupees (day’s wages ~100 RS). Rp=Indonesian Rupiah (3 months wages ~200000 Rp). NT$=Taiwan New Dollar (hourly wage ~NT$100). 
284 Tk=Bangladeshi Taka (daily wage ~100Tk). Sk=Slovak crowns (hourly wage ~60 Sk)
285 b This represents unbiased d-values. Positive effect sizes mean that offers are higher when stakes are small.  
286
287
288 Figure 1: Funnel plot of effect sizes (Cohen’s d) and their standard error for each study (which is 
289 a function of sample size). Each dot represents one study. The funnel plot shows little to no 
290 asymmetry, and a regression test for asymmetry was not significant (z=1.25, p=.21). This 
291 suggests that publication bias is not a problem. 
292         
293 Measures of Effect Size
294 Figure 2 is a forest plot of the effect sizes and confidence intervals of each study, as well 
295 as for each game type. Positive effect sizes indicate that offers were higher with lower stakes 
296 (i.e., in accordance with our predictions). Negative effect sizes indicate that offers were lower 
297 with lower stakes (i.e., contrary to predictions). A random-effects model was justified because 
298 the measure of heterogeneity, Q=47.27, d.f. = 30, p=0.0234, indicated significant heterogeneity. 
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299
300 Figure 2: Forest plot of the random-effects meta-analysis of effect sizes (Cohen’s d) with 95% confidence 
301 intervals for Ultimatum Games (top) and Dictator Games (bottom). Each dot represents the effect size of 
302 one study and the confidence intervals of that effect size; an arrow means that the confidence interval 
303 extends beyond the range of the graph. Diamonds represent the average effect size (top of the diamond) 
304 and 95% confidence interval of that average effect size (width of the diamond) within a category (i.e., 
305 within all UG, all DG, or overall). The vertical dashed line represents zero effect. Positive effect sizes 
306 indicate that offers are higher with low stakes.
307
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308 Average Effect of Stake Size in UG and DG
309 The average effect size of stake size over all UG and DG studies (Nd=31) was d=0.091, 
310 95% CI [0.002, 0.180], p=0.045. The positive value indicates that offers were significantly 
311 higher at lower stakes, albeit the effect size was small. Few studies reached statistical 
312 significance of α=.05 on their own, but when combined, the overall effect was significant at the 
313 α=.05 level. However, there was high heterogeneity among studies: τ2=0.0195 (total 
314 heterogeneity), I2=33.76% (total heterogeneity/total variability), H2=1.51 (total 
315 variability/sampling variability). This heterogeneity is highly significant: Q=47.27, d.f.=30, 
316 p=.0234. To attempt to resolve this heterogeneity, we first analyzed each game separately, and 
317 then conducted a moderator analysis with game type (UG vs. DG) as a predictor.  
318 Comparing stake size effects between UG and DG. Stakes had almost no effect in the 
319 thirteen UG studies: d= 0.017, 95% CI [-0.101, 0.135]. There was some heterogeneity among 
320 UG studies: τ2=0.0086 (total heterogeneity), I2=18.90% (total heterogeneity/total variability), 
321 H2=1.23 (total variability/sampling variability), but this heterogeneity was not significant 
322 Q=15.04, d.f.=12, p=.239.
323 Stakes had a small but significant effect in the eighteen DG studies: d=0.145, 95% CI 
324 [0.022, 0.269]. DG studies were heterogeneous: τ2=0.0231 (total heterogeneity), I2=36.17% (total 
325 heterogeneity/total variability), H2=1.57 (total variability/sampling variability), and this 
326 heterogeneity was significant Q=28.53, d.f.=17, p=.039. 
327 We conducted a moderator analysis of all 31 studies with UG as the baseline and DG as 
328 the moderator. The intercept (UG) was not significant, with an estimated effect size of d=.021, 
329 s.e.=0.066, z=0.327, p=.744, 95% CI [-0.107, 0.150]. Dictator Games have an effect size greater 
330 than zero (d=0.145, s.e.=0.059, z=2.475, p=.013, 95% CI [0.030, 0.259]). The moderator (DG) 
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331 accounts for 21.19% of the heterogeneity, but the difference between Dictator Games and 
332 Ultimatum Games does not reach traditional significance: effect of moderator d=0.123, 
333 s.e.=0.088, z=1.404, p=.160, 95% CI [-0.0488, 0.296]. The 83% confidence interval for the 
334 moderator excludes zero [0.003, 0.244], suggesting that there may be an effect of the moderator, 
335 but we should place less confidence in this result than if it had reached the traditional p<.05. 
336 There was high residual heterogeneity among studies: τ2=0.0154 (total heterogeneity), 
337 I2=28.24% (residual heterogeneity/total variability), H2=1.39 (unaccounted variability/sampling 
338 variability), and this residual heterogeneity was significant Q=43.57, d.f.=29, p=.040. Thus, there 
339 may be other factors that causes differences among effect sizes (especially within DG studies). 
340 Relationship of Effect Size to Difference in Stake Conditions Used
341 Does the effect of stakes depend on how different the stakes were? Studies varied widely 
342 in how different the stakes were, from a 1.75 times difference between lowest and highest stakes 
343 (Cherry, 2001) to a 100 times difference (Leibbrandt et al., 2015) or even a 1000 times 
344 difference (Andersen et al., 2011). These differences in stake sizes are on different orders of 
345 magnitude, so we addressed this non-linearity by taking the base 10 logarithm of the stake size 
346 differences. We then correlated the effect sizes of the various studies with the logs of stake 
347 differences (Figure 3). We note that the results are qualitatively similar if we use raw differences 
348 in stakes instead of log differences in stakes. 
349 Across all studies, there was a small-medium correlation between effect size and log 
350 differences in stakes (r29=.201), which was not significant due to sample size (p=.278). However, 
351 UG and DG differed in how the differences in stakes correlated with effect size. In the UG, there 
352 was a very weak and non-significant correlation between effect size and log difference in stakes 
353 (r11=.066, p=.830). By contrast, in the DG there was a medium-large correlation between effect 
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354 size and log difference in stakes (r16=.411, p=.090); this is significant with a directional one-
355 tailed test (p=.045), which is justified because the correlation cannot meaningfully be negative 
356 (i.e., it would make no sense for stakes to have more effect in studies when high and low stakes 
357 are the same than in studies where high and low stakes are very different). Combined with the 
358 results of the meta-analysis, our results suggest that stake size affects DG offers, and the effect 
359 gets bigger as the stakes get more different. By contrast, the evidence suggests that stake size 
360 does not affect UG offers no matter how different the stakes are. 
361
362 Figure 3: Scatterplot of the regression between the difference in stake size of a study and the 
363 effect size for that study (unbiased Cohen’s d). Each red circle represents one Dictator Game 
364 (DG) study, and each blue triangle represents one Ultimatum Game (UG) study. The solid red 
365 line is the regression line for DG studies (estimated d = -0.048 + 0.243*(log10 of stake 
366 difference)), and the dashed blue line is the regression line for UG studies (estimated d = 0.068 + 
367 0.021*(log10 of stake differences)). If we remove the UG outlier (Andersen et al., 2011), then 




371 The purpose of this study was to consolidate data on stake size effects from a number of 
372 UG and DG studies, in an attempt to summarize the current state of knowledge about the effect 
373 of stake size on proposer behavior. This would be the first meta-study on this topic, to the best of 
374 our knowledge, that included only games with real stakes and controlled for additional 
375 confounds as outlined in our exclusion criteria (Table 1), to solely measure effects on one-shot, 
376 2-player UG and DG studies. The hypotheses included that 1) as stake size increases, offer size 
377 will decrease in both the DG and UG owing to a higher cost of giving, and 2) DG offers will 
378 decrease more than UG offers because of the UG’s added dimension of risk. 
379 DG offers do decrease slightly with increasing stake size. The effect was small (d=0.14), 
380 but seems to get larger as the difference in stakes increases (r=.41). This pattern fits with Engel’s 
381 (2011) meta-regression finding that DG studies with large stake size had slightly smaller offers 
382 than those with small stake size. These two meta-analyses differ in their goals and their 
383 methodologies: Engel (2011) sought to understand what factors predict DG offers and used all 
384 previous DG studies in a regression (i.e., not just studies on stake size), whereas the current 
385 meta-analysis specifically examined studies that experimentally manipulated stake size. 
386 Together, their different methodologies provide convergent evidence that stake size does affect 
387 DG offers, albeit weakly. Previous studies have claimed to find no effect of stake size, but may 
388 have had insufficient power to detect small effects (e.g., total sample size of 40 in Carpenter et 
389 al., 2005).
390 By contrast, there is no evidence that people offer less money in high-stakes UG. The 
391 effect of stakes is almost zero in UG, and there is little evidence that stakes have more effect 
392 when the difference in stakes is larger. This finding refutes studies that find an effect of stakes in 
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393 the UG, but supports studies that propose that the presence of risk aversion will prevent a 
394 substantial change in offers with increasing stakes (e.g. Holt & Laury, 2002). However, we must 
395 note that our results say nothing about responder behaviour in the UG – high stakes might reduce 
396 people’s willingness to reject unfair UG offers, but this is beyond the scope of our study.  
397 As for Hypothesis 2, stake size did have a bigger effect on DG offers than UG offers 
398 (difference in d=0.12), but the 95% confidence intervals for this effect included zero. The 83% 
399 confidence intervals excluded zero, which is suggestive, but far from conclusive. As such, we 
400 cannot be confident about this effect and will need more studies on stake size to determine if it 
401 exists. This difference might have been significant if there had been more high-stakes DGs, 
402 because studies with large differences in stakes found stronger effects of stakes in DGs. If future 
403 studies confirm this effect, it would support the idea that risk aversion prevents people from 
404 changing their offers at higher UG stakes, when compared to the DG (e.g. Holt & Laury, 2002).  
405 Comparison to Other Stake Size Studies
406 Our study adds to the current literature investigating stake size effects in other bargaining 
407 and trust games (e.g., stake size effects in trust games, Johanssen-Stenman et al., 2005; no stake 
408 size effects in public goods games, Kocher et al., 2008; inconclusive stake size effects, 
409 Karagözoğlu & Urhan, 2016). Karagözoğlu and Urhan’s (2016) survey of bargaining games 
410 included the DG and UG, and could not come to a conclusion about stake effects because of the 
411 wide variation in findings. They included studies of games other than the DG and UG, as well as 
412 those with confounds we were able to exclude. We found somewhat less variation in the current 
413 study, with the majority of effect sizes around the zero mark with some wide outliers (e.g., 
414 Leibbrandt et al., 2015, Give condition) but these studies did not have much weight on the 
7
415 overall measure because of their small sample sizes. These consistencies allow for the relatively 
416 small confidence intervals around the average effect sizes we found.
417 Limitations 
418 Sample sizes. Some studies had small sample sizes, which leads us to question the 
419 reliability of their findings. For example, Leibbrandt and colleagues (2015) had only 21 
420 participants in the high stakes conditions in each of the DG and UG. This is understandable for 
421 budgetary reasons, but results in substantial sampling variation of what the “true” effect size is. 
422 For this reason, the meta-analytic software weighed each study’s contribution to the overall 
423 effect size based on inverse variance, so that studies with larger samples were weighed more 
424 heavily (see weightings in Table 1). This means that those outliers with large effect sizes but 
425 small samples did not contribute as heavily to the overall effect size. This correction should have 
426 reduced these significant findings’ potential to skew the results if, in fact, there is only a small 
427 effect size. Alternatively, this weighting and use of small sample size could have caused us to 
428 miss a larger effect of stakes. That these effects were on either side of zero, however, would have 
429 balanced out their strong effects to contribute to our finding of a near zero average for the UG. 
430 Stake sizes. We only included real-stake experiments and excluded those with 
431 hypothetical stakes, because participants will take the former more seriously, whereas in the 
432 latter there are no consequences for losing money, and it is unclear whether people treat different 
433 hypothetical stakes differently (see also Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). This resulted in some 
434 studies with relatively low stake sizes for the high-stake condition. The median high stakes 
435 condition was $20 in the DG and was $100 in the UG, which is somewhat high but not 
436 exorbitant. Only a few studies from Western societies used stakes more than US$20 (Carpenter 
437 et al., 2005; Carr & Mellizo, 2017; Cherry, 2001; Cherry et al., 2002; Gabay et al., 2018; 
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438 Hoffman et al., 1996), but studies in non-Western societies often had larger stakes in the local 
439 currency (Fu et al., 2007; Slonim & Roth, 1998), including some with more than three months’ 
440 salary (Andersen et al., 2011; Cameron, 1999; Leibbrandt et al., 2015). Nevertheless, because 
441 there were not many studies with stake sizes of more than $100, we may have been limited in our 
442 ability to see an effect that may be present with much higher stakes. 
443 In the DG, we found a medium-large correlation between the stake size difference in each 
444 study and the effects of stake size, such that studies with larger differences in stakes found larger 
445 effects of stakes. This correlation was significant at p<.05 using a directional one-tailed test, 
446 despite being underpowered (N=18). Perhaps we only found a small effect of stakes in the DG 
447 because most studies used only small differences in stakes. That being said, the regression 
448 equation suggests that even if stakes differ by two orders of magnitude (i.e., 100 times), the 
449 effect of stakes would only be d=0.44 (d = -0.048 + 0.243*2 = 0.438), which is a medium effect 
450 size. The regression equation suggests that stakes will only have a large effect (d=0.8) on DG 
451 offers when stakes differ by more than three orders of magnitude – we leave it to readers to 
452 decide how important that is in practice. In contrast to the results in DGs, in UGs there was only 
453 a weak and non-significant correlation between effect sizes and stake size differences, suggesting 
454 that using larger stake sizes would not change the effect sizes in the UG very much, if at all. 
455 Practical Implications
456 Overall, from the 18 DG studies analyzed, these findings suggest that people give less 
457 money in DG as the stakes increase, but not in the UG. This finding means that researchers could 
458 anticipate seeing slightly lower offers from high-stakes DG dictators than they expect from 
459 general averages found at low stake conditions, because of an increase of the cost of giving that 
460 results in increased selfishness. Thus, depending on the aim of the study, researchers should take 
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461 caution when determining which stake size to use. Lower, budget-friendly stakes may not be as 
462 representative of dictator giving as higher stakes would be, but provide a reasonable 
463 approximation (given that stakes had only a small effect on dictator giving). By contrast, the 
464 near-zero effect of stakes in the UG means that stake size may be less important to consider in 
465 these games, perhaps because of the UG’s added complexity (e.g., risk of rejection, anticipation 
466 of responder behavior). 
467 In addition, the use of effect sizes allows us to see the size of any potential effects, 
468 however small, of stake size on offer behavior. When multiple studies find the same small effect 
469 size, we can be more confident that the effect is real, even if no single study reached statistical 
470 significance. In this way, the use of effect sizes may refute studies that have reported no effect of 
471 stakes based on a lack of statistical significance. For example, Carpenter et al., (2005) report a 
472 non-significant effect of stakes in the UG and DG, but a reinterpretation of their results in terms 
473 of Cohen’s d reveals low to medium effects of increasing stakes on decreasing offers (e.g., 
474 d=0.33 in the DG). This indicates that individual studies reporting no effect of stakes sizes may 
475 (or may not) have found an effect that supports the current finding of a small effect size. 
476 We should note that even if different stakes do change the absolute amounts given in 
477 Dictator Games, this should not be problematic for most experiments. If there are two 
478 experimental conditions, each with the same high or low stakes, then those stakes should have 
479 the same effect on the experimental and the control condition. Any differences between an 
480 experimental and a control condition are due to the experimental manipulation, not the stakes 
481 (which are constant in both conditions). Thus, while stake size affects absolute amounts in 
482 Dictator Games, there is no reason for it to affect relative amounts between two experimental 
483 conditions, and the latter is what matters in most experiments. 
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484 Future Directions
485 Future studies on stake size effects should attempt to ensure a large sample size to get a 
486 representative effect, as many of the currently available studies use relatively small samples. 
487 Representative sampling may be easier for contemporary studies with the use of sampling 
488 technology such as MTurk (e.g. Amir et al., 2012). The other option, to use hypothetical stakes, 
489 could be analyzed for stake size effects if the effect or lack of effect of hypothetical stakes 
490 becomes more clear in future studies. If hypothetical stakes were shown not to be a confound, 
491 their use to analyze stake size effects at much larger stakes may be justified. 
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Table 3   
Summary of Excluded Studies and Reason for Exclusion
Authors Type of Game Reason for Exclusion
Amir, Rand & Kobi Gal (2012) DG/UG Hypothetical versus real stakes instead of varying the real stake level
Andersen et al. (2011), Wealth 
condition UG
Earned stakes (data from No Wealth condition were 
included)
Andreoni & Miller (2002) DG variant Non-equivalence of tokens across conditions because worth different amounts to proposer & responder
Bardsley (2008) DG Give vs. take frame; give frame had responders start with an endowment to vary inequality
Barr et al. (2015) DG 4-player DG; earned vs. unearned stakes
Batista, Silverman & Yang (2015) DG Data unavailable and unable to contact 
Bechler (2013) DG/UG Hypothetical stakes
Bechler, Green & Myerson (2015) DG/UG Hypothetical stakes
Bediou et al. (2012) DG Earned stakes, no control condition
Bekkers (2007) DG variant Earned endowments
Ben-Ner, Kramer & Levy (2008) DG Hypothetical vs. real stakes instead of varying the real stake level
Bethwaite & Thompkinson (1993) UG Data unavailable and unable to contact any authors
Bhogal, Galbraith & Manktelow (2016) DG Earned monetary vs. non-monetary stakes 
Blake & Rand (2010) DG Participants were children
Bolton, Katok & Zwick (1998) DG Stakes did not vary across conditions; repeated interactions
Bühren & Kundt (2015) DG Hypothetical vs. real stakes instead of varying the real stake level
Busch & Krishna (unpublished) UG Participants primed before decisions
Carr & Mellizo (2017), Responder 
Produces and Responder Gambles 
conditions
UG Responder earns the endowments (data from Exogenous condition were included)
Chang et al. (2014) DG Hypothetical stakes
Charness & Rabin (2002) DG Two options given for a single offer/round, but each option totaled to a different stake size
Chen et al. (2013) DG/SVO Stakes only differ between the DG and SVO games
19
Cherry (2001), Earned Money condition DG Earned stakes (data from Allocated Money condition were included)
Cherry, Frykblon & Shorgen (2002), 
Blind and Double Blind with Earnings 
conditions
DG Earned endowments (data from Baseline were included)
Cherry & Shogren (2008), Earned 
Endowment condition DG
Earned stakes (data from Windfall condition were 
included)
Crockett et al. (2008) UG Data unavailable at time of submission
Dalbert & Umlauft (2009) DG Hypothetical vs. real stakes instead of varying the real stake level
De Bruyn & Bolton (2008) - Non-experimental model of giving in bargaining games
Dickinson (2000) UG Non-experimental model based on previous experimental results
Diekmann (2004) DG variant
Priming before task: proposers given offers from 
computerized proposer to examine reciprocity in future 
games
El Harbi et al. (2015) DG
Participants are given 3 alternative ratios to split the 
stake (5/7, 4/1, 3/3) that do not clearly reflect stake size 
effects
Engel (2011) DG Non-experimental/meta-analysis, measure of effect included studies that warrant exclusion here
Fehr, Tougareva, & Fischbacher (2014) - Game is neither a DG nor UG
Fiala et al. (2016) UG Hypothetical vs. real stakes instead of varying the real stake level
Fisman, Kariv & Markovitz (2007) DG Data unavailable and unable to contact
Freiburg & Krishna (unpublished) UG Participants primed before decisions
Greitemann & Krishna (unpublished) UG No data on proposers, only responders
Grossman & Eckel (2015) DG Give vs. take frame, no control or stake size variation
Güth (2010) - Neither DG/UG; non-experimental model
Güth & Kirchkamp (2012) UG variant Yes-No game: responder did not know stake size
Güth, Levati & Ploner (2012) DG/UG Proposer chooses stake size in all conditions 
Güth & Tietz (1988) UG Responder could make counter-offer, which changes proposer’s strategies
Haas (2009) UG Data unavailable and could not contact author
Halali, Bereby-Meyer & Ockenfels 
(2013) DG/UG Data unavailable and unable to contact
Harrison & El Mouden (2011), T1 and 
T2 conditions DG Earned stakes (data from M1 condition were included)
Harrison & Rutström (2002) UG Unpublished manuscript, not accessible online and authors do not have it
20
Heinz Juranek Rau (2012), Real Effort 
condition DG
Earned stakes (data from Windfall condition were 
included)
Henrich et al. (2010) DG Cross-cultural study where all stake sizes are equivalent in purchasing power
Holt & Laury (2002) - Neither a DG or UG
Hou et al. (2016) UG Data unavailable and could not contact any authors
John & Thomsen (2015) UG Participants were children
Jordan, McAuliffe & Rand (2015) DG Included 3rd party punishment
Karagözoğlu & Urhan (2016) DG/UG Non-experimental/meta-analysis, measure of effect included studies that warrant exclusion here
Kench & Niman (2010) DG Earned stakes, no control condition
Klaffehn & Krishna (unpublished) UG Stakes so small (<€0.01) as to be hypothetical
Kocher, Martinsson & Visser (2008) - Game is neither a DG nor UG
Korenok, Millner & Razzolini (2012) DG Responders started with an endowment to vary inequality; control conditions do not vary in stake size
Korenok, Millner & Razzolini (2013) DG Responders started with an endowment to vary inequality; control conditions do not vary in stake size
Kriss, Nagel & Weber (2013) UG Responders did not know stake size, no control conditions present
Lee & Lau (2013) UG Responders did not know stake size, no control conditions present
Limback (2012) DG Participants were children
List (2007) DG Responders started with an endowment to vary inequality
List & Cherry (2008) DG Data not provided and authors did not have them
Marwell & Ames (1980) - Neither DG/UG
Mitzkewitz & Nagel (1993) UG Responder did not know stake size, no control conditions
Munier & Zaharia (2003) UG
Stake size was confounded with order effects (stake 
size varied within participants, but order was not 
counterbalanced)
Neelin (1988) - Neither a DG or UG
Neilson (2009) DG Non-experimental model
Novakova & Flegr (2013) DG/UG Hypothetical stakes only
21
Oberholzer-Gee, Waldfogel & White 
(2010) - Game is neither a DG nor UG
Ockenfels & Werner (2012) DG Repeated interactions: participants made offers for each stake condition at the same time
Ploner & Regner (2013) DG Stakes earned by rolling a die
Posid, Fazio & Cordes (2015) DG Participants were children
Rapoport & Sundali (1996) UG Responder did not know stake size/no control conditions
Rapoport, Sundali & Seale (1996) UG Responder did not know stake size/no control conditions
Reinstein & Reiner (2012), Performance 
condition DG
Earned stakes (data from Random condition were 
included)
Rese & Schons (2013) UG Repeated interactions; Computer proposer
Roth et al. (1991) UG Cross-cultural study where all stake sizes are equivalent in purchasing power
Ruffle (1998), Hypothetical and Skill 
conditions DG/UG
Either not real stakes or earned stakes (data from Real 
and Coin conditions were included)
Schulz et al. (2011) DG Stake value did not vary across conditions; repeated interactions
Straub & Murnighan (1995) UG Data unavailable and unable to contact any authors
Sundelin & Axelsson (unpublished) UG No data for proposers, only responders
Tompkinson & Bethwaite (1995) UG Data unavailable and unable to contact any authors
Tonin & Vlassopoulos (2017) - Game is neither a DG nor UG (giving to charity); also earned endowments
Van Donge (2015) - Non-experimental prediction model
VanKoten, Ortmann & Babicky (2013) DG/UG
Stake consisted of lottery tickets with different levels 
of risk, cannot define stake sizes independent of risk 
manipulation
Wang, Chen & Wang (2014) UG Non-experimental prediction model
Yamagashi et al. (2016) PDG Neither DG/UG
Zhou et al. (2014) UG No data for proposers, only responders; does not distinguish between computer and human proposers
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